The Determinants of IMF Lending by RENEE ADRIA KING
  
 
 
  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
 
 
 
学校编码：10384                                                            分类号_______密级 ______ 
学 号：27720141154619                 UDC ______       
 
 
硕  士  学  位  论  文 
 
国际货币基金贷款的决定因素 
The Determinants of IMF Lending  
Renee King  
 
 
指导教师姓名： 
 
Prof. Brett Graham 
专 业 名 称 ： 金融工程 
论 文提 交日期： 2 0 1 7 年 0 9 月 
论 文答 辩日期： 2 0 1 7 年 1 1 月 
学 位授 予日期：                     年 月 
  
 
答辩委员会主席：___________           
       评    阅    人：___________       
 
2017 年 09 月 厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
 
  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 2 
 
厦门大学学位论文原创性声明 
 
本人呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下,独立完成的研究成果。本人
在论文写作中参考其他个人或集体已经发表的研究成果，均在文中以适当方
式明确标明，并符合法律规范和《厦门大学研究生学术活动规范（试行）》
。 
另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）的
研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的资助，在
（               ）实验室完成。（请在以上括号内填写课题或课题组负
责人或实验室名称，未有此项声明内容的，可以不作特别声明。） 
本人声明该学位论文不存在剽窃、抄袭等学术不端行为，并愿意承担因
学术不端行为所带来的一切后果和法律责任。 
 
声明人  （签名）： 
指导教师（签名）：   
 
 
          年   月   日 
 
 
 
  厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 3 
 
厦门大学学位论文著作权使用声明 
 
本人同意厦门大学根据《中华人民共和国学位条例暂行实施办法》等规
定保留和使用此学位论文，并向主管部门或其指定机构送交学位论文（包括
纸质版和电子版），允许学位论文进入厦门大学图书馆及其数据库被查阅、
借阅。本人同意厦门大学将学位论文加入全国博士、硕士学位论文共建单位
数据库进行检索，将学位论文的标题和摘要汇编出版，采用影印、缩印或者
其它方式合理复制学位论文。 
本学位论文属于： 
（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，于   
年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 
（ √ ）2.不保密，适用上述授权。 
（请在以上相应括号内打“√”或填上相应内容。保密学位论文应是已
经厦门大学保密委员会审定过的学位论文，未经厦门大学保密委员会审定的
学位论文均为公开学位论文。此声明栏不填写的，默认为公开学位论文，均
适用上述授权。） 
                             声明人（签名）： 
2017年      月      
 
 
 
  
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
 4 
 
摘 要 
 
 
 
当一个国家经历重大的经济危机时，他们可能会求助于国际货币基金组织寻求某种救济。
本研究的目的是确定贷款计划的决定因素，特别关注国际货币基金组织提供的贷款核准、
贷款规模和贷款参与率。这项研究的重点主要是政治因素对这一决策过程的影响，联合国
大会投票是政治亲密的代表。该项研究审查了2008国际货币基金组织贷款改革前后的这些
变化。特别是与美利坚合众国和欧洲的政治亲密关系——本研究的目的是界定德国、法国和
英国。通过协议和扩展基金设施站被选为本研究感兴趣的贷款，因为它们是由国际货币基
金组织拨付资金的最大份额。数据是一个不平衡的面板，从1975到2015年跨越40年，大多
数变量以五年的间隔收集。使用概率和受限Tobit模型估计结果表明政治对国际货币基金
组织的决策过程的影响是显著的，特别是在前2008的贷款审批和贷款利率改革后参与。 
 
关键词：宏观经济学，经济增长，国内生产总值，国际政治 
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Abstract  
 
When a country experiences significant economic distress, they may turn to the International 
Monetary Fund in search of some type of relief. The aim of this study is to ascertain the 
determinants of loan programs, with specific focus on loan approval, loan size and loan 
participation rate, offered by the International Monetary Fund. The study focuses primarily on the 
influence of political factors on this decision-making process using General Assembly votes in the 
United Nations as a proxy for political closeness.  The study examines the changes in these effects 
before and after the lending reforms of the International Monetary Fund in 2008. Political 
closeness explored in particular with the United States of America and Europe – which for the 
purpose of this study is defined as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The Stand-By 
Agreement and the Extended Fund Facility were chosen as the loans of interest for this study since 
they represent the largest share of funds disbursed by the International Monetary Fund. The data 
is an unbalanced panel and spans 40 years from 1975 – 2015 with most variables being collected 
in five-year intervals. Using a Probit and censored Tobit models to estimate it was found that the 
influence of politics on the decision-making process of the International Monetary Fund was 
significant before and after the reforms of 2008 particularly on loan approval and loan participation 
rates.  
 
 
Key Words: Macroeconomics, Economic Growth, Gross Domestic Product, International Politics 
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Introduction 
 
Background  
The idea of the International Monetary Fund was originally conceptualized at the 1944 
Bretton Woods conference of the United Nations. The aim was to construct a framework based 
primarily on economic co-operation in an attempt to avoid similar conditions which resulted 
in the Great Depression. The period of the Great Depression was characterized by sharp 
increases in barriers to trade by countries endeavoring to improve their then failing economies. 
This resulted in national currencies being devalued and a global fall in world trade and gave 
rise to a need for a new system of international monetary co-operation. The Articles of 
Agreement that were ratified by 29 countries on December 27,1945 marked the beginning of 
the International Monetary Fund. 
The International Monetary Fund is headed by a Managing Director who is elected to 
the position by an Executive Board for a renewable period of five years. The Managing 
Director is aided by a first deputy and three other deputies. The staff of the International 
Monetary Fund boasts 2700 members of staff from 148 states worldwide.         
The International Monetary Fund’s primary mandate was to safeguard the stability of 
the global monetary system; after, this was restructured to include all concerns regarding 
macroeconomic and financial concerns that would affect international stability. The Fund 
executes this mandate by monitoring both the global economy as well as the economies of 
individual members of the International Monetary Fund. This execution is carried out through 
the provision of guidance on necessary policy modifications and loans to countries facing 
issues regarding balance of payments, currency stabilization and international reserves.   
The loans provided by the fund are financed by member states through a quota system. 
Under this system, member states are each allocated quota based on their relative standings in 
the world economy. These quotas are measured in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and are also 
used as the basis for determining each country voting power in the decision-making of the 
organization.   
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Loan Types  
The International Monetary Fund offers two categories of loan programs: concessional 
and non-concessional lending.  Concessional loans are focused solely on the financial needs of 
Low Income Countries (LICs) and include programs such as the Extended Credit Facility 
(ECF), Standby Credit Facility (SCF), and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). These loans are 
repeatedly revised and designed to be more flexible so as to better cater for the various needs 
of Low Income Countries. The structure of these loans was broadened to uphold their standing 
in relation to increases in trade, flow of capital and production with increased concessional 
financing and a biannually reviewed rate of interest.  
Non-concessional loans include the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), the Flexible Credit 
Line (FCL), the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and 
the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI).  These non-concessional loans are provided depending 
on the International Monetary Fund’s market-based interest rate which is calculated weekly. 
This interest rate, also known as the rate of charge, is constructed using a Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) interest rate which takes into consideration interest rate movement in key 
international money markets on a short-term basis.  Under non-concessional loan programs, 
the maximum amount a country is able to borrow differs based on the type of loan requested 
and is in most cases is a multiple of that particular country’s IMF quota. This maximum, or 
access limit, can only be surpassed under special situations.    
 
Reform of Loan Policy  
In 2008, after the global economic downturn, the International Monetary Fund enacted 
measures of reform to address key issues with both the stigma surrounding itself as a loan 
agency as well as the loan policies. The reforms were to open up talks so as to provide increased 
access to their loans. As a part of this reformation, the International Monetary Fund introduced 
the Flexible Credit Line, a new stream of loans targeted toward countries with emerging 
markets. The new framework instituted by the International Monetary Fund would affect all 
loans across the board so as to better monitor the achievement of struggling economies. The 
new framework utilizes this new dynamic means of assessment by reforming the way in which 
countries can access loans – in tranches1. There is no longer the need for reapplication for a 
loan in the event that they did not meet a structural performance criteria. These reform policies 
                                                      
1 Incremental disbursements of funds made after a structural condition is met.  
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by the IMF were also implemented to offer more transparency in this decision-making process 
due to the high level of scrutiny it has faced over the years and increase access to loans. 
 
 
 
Research Question  
The purpose of this paper is to determine the factors that influence how the International 
Monetary Fund decides on the nature of non-concessional loans and whether or not there exists 
a connection with a country’s political proximity to the major shareholders of the IMF. The 
paper further probes the effect that the reforms enacted by the IMF in 2008 had on this 
influence.  
When a country undergoes consecutive periods of balance of payments deficits 
resulting in slow or stagnant economic growth, one source of assistance is the International 
Monetary Fund. If the loan is approved it is accompanied by a schedule of economic goals and 
conditions that need to be met within an outlined period of time to ensure continued 
disbursement of funds. Due to the strict nature of the conditions that accompany these loans, 
some countries undergo worsening economies and have often condemned the IMF for this. 
This causes IMF loans to be viewed as a type of final resort in any effort to stimulate a failing 
economy.  
This paper seeks to determine what occurs once a loan is applied for, that is, the factors 
that determine the approval of a loan, the size of a loan and the length of time a country spends 
under a loan agreement. This paper also seeks to determine the effect, if any, that close political 
influences or ties to major international shareholders of the IMF has on this process and how 
this has changed since the reformations of 2008.  
This paper posits that closer political ties to larger stronger economies which possess a 
larger quota share in the Fund, and as a result greater voting rights, affects the likelihood of 
loans being approved, the size of the loan approved as well as the length of time during which 
a country will spend under a loan program. For the purposes of this study, we focus solely on 
the Stand-By Agreement and the Extended Fund Facility. This is done due to the large 
proportion of funds disbursed by the International Monetary Fund, that were made under these 
loan agreements2. The study attempts to determine if there exists any bias for countries that are 
                                                      
2 Results may be seen in Appendix I 
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of interest to countries in the International Monetary Fund who have larger shares and voting 
rights and explores the effect that reformations to loan policies made by the International 
Monetary Fund in 2008 have had on the loans subsequent to these changes. 
 
 
Literature Review 
  
Previous Studies 
There have been many studies conducted on International Monetary Fund related 
topics.  Studies generally focus on the effect of these loan programs on economic variables 
such as growth and labour. However, studies which focus on the influence of political factors 
on this decision-making process prior to and after the 2008 reforms are fewer and more limited 
in nature.  
Prior studies that have probed the political aspect of lending by the International 
Monetary Fund include the studies of Barro and Lee (2002), Yakee and Oatley (2004), 
Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006), and Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009). Most studies 
agree that there is political influenced being wielded on the part of larger shareholders of the 
International Monetary Fund for their own benefit.  
One of the major contributions to this topic is conveyed by Barro and Lee (2002) where 
it is found that political alignment with the United States and Europe3, particularly Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, has a significant influence on the approval, size and 
participation in loans by the International Monetary Fund. The paper utilizes votes made in the 
United Nations General Assembly to quantify what they label as political proximity as an 
influencer of these IMF related variables. Here it was found that a close proximity with both 
the United States and Europe have a positive and significant effect on International Monetary 
Fund loan approval, loan participation and loan size. 
Yakee and Oatley (2004) noted a shift toward the United States of America but for the 
purposes of their own economic gain. This paper posits that the United States of America uses 
                                                      
3 From this point forward, Europe will be in reference to figures relating to Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom due to the high level of correlation found between the three (Barro and Lee). 
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its influence in the International Monetary Fund to shape the content of the conditions of loan 
agreements. This, they found, was to further the country’s own financial and foreign policy 
agendas with larger loans going to countries already heavily indebted to the United States more 
so than other major players in the International Monetary Fund.  This conclusion is supported 
in Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006) where they explored both the economic and political 
determinants of lending by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund with 
particular focus on the Middle East and North Africa. The assessed the geo-political influences 
of this region and found that lending offered by the International Monetary Fund was 
responsive we the political interests of their major shareholders.  
Barro’s use of United Nations voting patterns as a proxy for political closeness is further 
supported by Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009).  Here they specifically investigated 
favourable treatment as it regards loans by the International Monetary Fund and voting in the 
United Nations Security Council. Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) found that there did exist 
favourable treatment between temporary members of the United Nations Security Council and 
participation in loan programs offered by the International Monetary Fund with a notable 
reduction in the number of usually strict conditions that go along with the loans as a result of 
being a member of the United Nations Security Council. It was posited that this was in fact a 
mechanism used by major Fund shareholders to win favour when furthering their agendas when 
voting on the Security Council.  
The data was structured closely to that of Barro and Lee (2002) with the use of 
indicators in five-year intervals. This structure proved most reliable for studies of this nature 
and were also utilized by Vreeland (2003) when determining the effect of loan agreements on 
labour. Bird and Rowland (2001) also utilize economic variables such as foreign reserves to 
imports ratio and macroeconomic indicators as a basis to highlight the influence of political 
factors in the decision-making of loans by the International Monetary Fund.  
This paper attempts go a step further by quantify the effects of the recent lending 
reforms made by the International Monetary Fund to truly ascertain if this brings to an end the 
era of political influences gauging the disbursement of loans and the nature of these loans. This 
will be achieved through the use of United Nations General Assembly votes as a proxy for 
political closeness and macroeconomic variables over a period of 40 years from 1975 to 2015 
so as to determine a before and after effect of new lending policies implemented by the 
International Monetary Fund in 2008.  
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The Empirical Framework 
 
Data  
The data follows an unbalanced panel data structure which includes 153 International 
Monetary Fund member countries spanning a period of 40 years. The data is collated in five-
year intervals from 1975 to 2015. Most variable data are collected at the beginning of the five-
year intervals, that is, during the years 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010 and 2015. 
The variables collected in this manner represent, real Gross Domestic Product, foreign 
reserves, membership in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), per capita Gross Domestic Product and quota shares as fraction of the total held at 
the International Monetary Fund. Natural logs and quadratic forms were also used for the 
variables for quota share and real Gross Domestic Product. The variable representing the 
growth rate of per capita GDP which is also included in the study, was collected in lagged five-
year averages, that is, the time point for the year 1980 would be representative of the average 
of the growth rates of per capita GDP during the period of 1975 to 1979 this is due to the lagged 
effect of growth rate policies.  
The IMF variables of interest representing loan program approvals, participation and 
sizes were all collected on the basis of occurrence. Loan program approvals were inputted as 
binary with a value of 1 representing if a country, during a particular five-year period, engaged 
the International Monetary Fund in a loan agreement and 0 otherwise. Loan participation is a 
fraction of the total number of time during a five-year period that a country was engaged in a 
loan program with the International Monetary Fund and as such records values that do not 
exceed a value not greater than 1. A recording of this value implies that a country was engaged 
in a loan program for that entire five-year period. The variable representing the size of the loan 
is recorded as a ratio of the withdrawn loan amount to the country’s GDP.  
Political variables were introduced to determine the effects of political influence or 
closeness with the United State of America, and Europe – particularly the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany. This was to determine the effect, if any, that close political ties with 
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larger shareholders in the International Monetary Fund has on loan participation, loan approval 
and loan size. These political variables were constructed based on the example of Barro & Lee. 
The plenary votes were collated for each beginning period, that is, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. A country recorded a value of 1 whenever it voted in the 
same way either the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and Germany and 
a value of zero otherwise. This data was aggregated to illustrate the percentage of time that a 
country voted with either the United States of America or Europe. This information was used 
to form the basis of the political proximity variable used in this study.  
In order to effectually attain results on the determinants of the approval of loans, length 
of participation under a loan program and the size of loan awarded by the International 
Monetary Fund and the effect political linkages on the same, the study focuses solely on Stand-
By Agreements and Extended Fund Facility loans due to the high level of desirability of these 
types of IMF loans. The Stand-By Agreement and the Extended Fund Facilities are the focus 
of this study because they represent the highest amount of funds disbursed by the International 
Monetary Fund. The paper seeks to determine if it is political ties that affect the disbursement 
of these types of loans.  
It is hypothesized that while economic difficulties may determine a country’s need to 
engage the International Monetary Fund, it is in fact political ties that may actually influence 
the nature of the loan program, that is, approval, participation and size. Taking this into 
consideration and with the higher level of difficulty it requires to be approved for these non-
concessional loans this paper seeks to determine if political proximity plays any role in 
determining whether or not a country is awarded a non-concessional loan when in fact the 
nature of their economy at the time of engagement qualified them for a concessional loan.  
Due to the nature of the endogenous and exogenous variables. The data experienced 
reverse causality concerns where the dependent variables, IMF loan approval, IMF loan size 
and IMF loan participation both affect and are affected by the macroeconomic indicators used 
for this study such as GDP, GDP per capita, and the lagged GDP per capita growth rate.  
The dataset was collated using annual data, when available, from the Penn World 
Tables version 9.0, the International Monetary Fund’s International Finance Statistics and the 
World Bank online databases. Complete data was available for most countries save for some 
states which were formed after the beginning time period such as those of the Post-Soviet 
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